I’ve seen a few scams go around recently that took advantage of people not really understanding Ian Coleman’s BIP39 tool. The problem is simple: when you look at a tool like this, it is easy to get confused about what information is secret, what is semi-public, and what is safe to share with others.
That confusion has cost people money. Some victims did not know what they could or couldn’t share. Others were told by scammers that they needed to back up extra pieces of information from the tool. In most cases, that “helpful” advice was part of the scam.
In this article, I’ll walk through the same points covered in my video: Watch the video. The goal is to give you a clear, practical reference you can use later when someone asks for wallet information.

Start offline and treat the tool as a learning aid
Ian Coleman’s BIP39 tool is useful for understanding how wallet keys relate to each other. If you use it, I recommend running it offline or air-gapped, such as in Tails Linux using a standalone version. That way, you are not exposing sensitive information to an internet-connected environment unnecessarily.
The important thing is not just “using the tool.” The important thing is understanding what each field means and how dangerous it would be if someone else got hold of it.
I use color-coding to make this easier:
- Red: never share, ever.
- Orange: do not share casually; it can expose an account or coin.
- Yellow: individual address private keys; still secret.
- Brown: xpubs and extended public keys; privacy-sensitive.
- Blue: public addresses and related public keys; generally safe to share.
That color system is the fastest way to avoid making a costly mistake.
Red: never share these items with anyone
The red area contains the most dangerous information in the entire wallet setup. If an attacker gets any of these, they can steal everything associated with that seed or account structure.
These include:
- Entropy
- Filtered entropy
- BIP39 word indexes
- The BIP39 mnemonic phrase
- Your passphrase, if you use one
- The BIP39 seed
Do not share these with anyone. It does not matter whether you are using a hardware wallet such as Trezor, Ledger, or Keepkey. A legitimate customer support representative will never ask for this information. If someone claims to be support and asks for your 24-word phrase, passphrase, entropy, word indexes, or seed, that is a red flag.
With a hardware wallet, you should normally enter your recovery phrase once during setup. After that, the wallet software should not need it again. If a wallet app keeps asking for your full backup information, treat that as suspicious unless there is a very clear and trusted reason.
What entropy, word indexes, mnemonic, and seed really mean
These terms can sound technical, but they are all related to the same core idea: randomness becomes a usable wallet structure.
- Entropy is the raw random data used to create your BIP39 phrase.
- Filtered entropy is another representation of that randomness in the tool’s context.
- Word indexes are the positions of each word in the standard BIP39 word list.
- The BIP39 mnemonic is the human-readable recovery phrase, often 12 or 24 words depending on your setup.
- The passphrase, if you use one, adds an extra layer to the derivation process.
- The BIP39 seed is another derived representation of the same underlying information.
The key point is that these are not random unrelated values. They are different expressions of related secret material. If a hacker gets enough of this information, they can access your funds.
Your main backup is usually just the mnemonic plus passphrase
This is one of the most important parts of the whole topic: in most normal wallet setups, your BIP39 mnemonic phrase plus an optional passphrase is the only backup you need.
That means you do not normally need to back up:
- entropy
- filtered entropy
- word indexes
- xpubs
- individual private keys
- extended private keys
- public addresses as “backup” items
- transaction history or wallet files as a substitute for your seed phrase
Your mnemonic is the source. Everything else is derived from it, directly or indirectly. If you think about how the tool works, the only thing you actually entered was your recovery phrase and possibly a passphrase. The rest came out of that input.
A common scam pattern is to tell people they need to back up extra pieces of information “just in case.” The attacker then asks for those items one by one under the guise of being helpful. That is when people get into trouble.
If you are trying to keep things simple and secure, remember this:
Your BIP39 mnemonic phrase plus your passphrase, if you use one, is usually all you need to back up.
Keep that backup safe, offline, and away from anyone else. Do not store it in a password manager unless you fully understand the risks. Do not photograph it and leave the photo on your phone. Do not email it to yourself casually. Do not write it down where someone can find it while cleaning or borrowing your computer.
Orange: extended private keys are account-level secrets
The next category is orange. These items are not as catastrophic as sharing your full mnemonic, but they are still extremely dangerous. They can expose all coins for a selected coin or account.
Examples include:
- BIP32 root key
- Account extended private key
- BIP32 extended private key
If you share one of these, an attacker may be able to steal everything from the relevant account or coin structure depending on what exactly was shared and how your wallet is configured.
This is another area where scammers have tried to trick people into thinking they need to back up extra data. They did not. Your mnemonic phrase already covers the recovery need for standard wallets. Extended private keys are operational secrets, not backup items you should be handing around.
Why this matters with hardware wallets
Hardware wallet users often see extended public keys and sometimes extended private keys in advanced settings or developer tools. That does not mean those values are safe to share just because they appear in a technical interface.
If someone asks for an extended private key, the answer should almost always be no. There is very little normal reason another person needs that from you. If you are setting up a trusted watch-only wallet, there may be legitimate use of public extended keys, but even then you need to understand what you are doing and who you are sharing it with.
Yellow: individual address private keys are still secret
The yellow area covers the private keys for individual addresses. These are less broad than account-level or seed-level secrets, but they are still completely sensitive.
If someone has the private key for one address, they can move funds from that specific address. They may not be able to drain every other address in your wallet, but they do not need to. If there is money in that address, it is gone.
So even though an individual private key is more limited than a full seed phrase, you should still never share it casually.
Forks, airdrops, snapshots, and block trains
This becomes especially important when forks, airdrops, snapshots, or similar events happen. Sometimes a new chain gives users coins based on what they held in an existing cryptocurrency at a certain point. To claim those new coins, some services may ask for private keys.
That is risky.
When Bitcoin Cash forked from Bitcoin, and later when Bitcoin Gold happened, people were encouraged to enter private keys into various wallets or websites to claim the new coins. Some of those sites or wallets were scams. People entered their private keys, lost their original funds, and were left with nothing.
If you ever feel compelled to enter a private key to claim a fork, airdrop, snapshot, or similar event, be extremely careful. Use official tools when they exist. Hardware wallet manufacturers often provide official split or migration tools for this reason. If the process requires entering sensitive keys into an unknown website, stop and think very hard before proceeding.
One practical safety step: if you must deal with a risky claim process using an address that holds your main coins, consider moving the original funds off that address first, especially if the fork or snapshot has already happened. That can reduce the damage if something goes wrong. But be careful, because some processes have timing or eligibility rules, and moving coins too early may affect what you receive.
The safest approach is usually to use official tools, keep your main holdings on addresses that do not need to expose private keys, and avoid entering sensitive information into unfamiliar services.
Brown: xpubs are useful but not fully safe
The brown category includes extended public keys, often called xpubs. These are not the same as private keys, so sharing them does not directly let someone steal your coins. But they do have privacy implications.
If someone has an xpub for a given coin and account, they can identify all of the public addresses that will be generated in that account. Wallets often generate new receiving addresses over time, usually in sequence. An attacker with the xpub can see those addresses even before you use them.
That may not sound like a big deal at first, but it matters if you care about privacy. If someone can map your future addresses to your past activity, they can follow your funds more easily.
The special case: xpub plus one private key
There is an important exception worth understanding.
If someone has both your xpub and one associated private key from that account, they may be able to derive the other private keys in that account. That does not give them your entire seed or every coin you own across all wallets, but it can expose everything within that specific account structure.
That is why xpubs should only be shared with apps or people you trust. There are legitimate uses. Some watch-only wallets let you monitor addresses using an xpub without exposing private keys. That can be convenient if you want to check balances without signing transactions on the same device.
But do not just hand your xpub to random people. There is usually no reason someone needs it from you. If a “support” person asks for your xpub, that should make you pause. A public address may be enough for normal receiving or payment requests. An xpub gives much more visibility than most people realize.

Blue: public addresses are generally safe to share
The blue category is the part you can normally share with others. This includes your public addresses and the public keys associated with those addresses.
A public address is meant to be shared. That is how people send you funds. A public key, in this context, is also not a secret that lets someone steal coins by itself.
However, there is still a privacy consideration. Individual addresses are not magically anonymous forever. If an attacker can analyze your transactions over time, they may link different addresses together. For example, if you send money from one address to another, or if multiple people pay into the same service and that service moves funds around, patterns can emerge.
So while public addresses are safe to share in the sense that they do not directly expose private keys, they are not completely unlinkable if you use them carelessly.
A practical privacy habit
If you have an address holding a large amount of value and you do not want everyone to know exactly how much is there, be careful about sharing that specific address or addresses linked to it through transactions. You may prefer to use fresh receiving addresses for different purposes and avoid publicly broadcasting the balance of your main holding address.
That does not mean you need to become paranoid about every transaction. It just means understanding that public blockchain data allows analysis over time. The safer habit is simple: share what you need, avoid unnecessary exposure, and do not treat public addresses as completely invisible.

A quick decision guide
When someone asks you for wallet information, use this simple checklist:
-
Are they asking for your 24-word phrase?
No legitimate support person should ask for that. Stop. -
Are they asking for a passphrase?
Do not share it. If you do not have one, say so and be even more suspicious of the request. -
Are they asking for entropy, word indexes, or seed data?
That is secret material. Do not share it. -
Are they asking for an extended private key?
Treat that as a serious security risk. Do not share it unless you fully understand the operation and trust the recipient completely. -
Are they asking for an individual address private key?
That can drain that address. Do not share it casually, especially with unknown websites or services. -
Are they asking for your xpub?
It is less dangerous than a private key, but it can reduce privacy and may become more dangerous if combined with another leaked key. Share only when necessary and with trusted tools. -
Are they asking for a public address?
That is usually fine to share. Just remember that transaction analysis can link addresses over time. -
If in doubt, what happens if the requested information disappears from your wallet or tool after sharing it?
If giving it away could remove control of funds or expose sensitive data, do not give it away.

How to avoid the most common mistakes
Most people do not lose funds because they accidentally typed a wrong word. They lose funds because they shared something sensitive with someone who claimed to be helpful.
Here are the habits that will protect you:
- Keep your mnemonic phrase offline and secure.
- Do not store your full recovery phrase in an email, cloud note, or unencrypted file.
- Use a passphrase only if you understand how it changes your backup requirements.
- Never enter your full seed phrase into random websites.
- Be extremely careful with private keys during forks or airdrops.
- Prefer official hardware wallet tools for migrations and splits.
- Do not share xpubs unless there is a clear, trusted reason.
- Assume public addresses can be analyzed over time.
- When someone asks for key material, ask yourself: “What would an attacker do with this?”
That last question is powerful. If the answer is “they could steal my coins” or “they could track all my future receiving addresses,” you should not share it unless you have a very strong reason to trust the person or service.
What to back up, and what not to bother backing up
To keep this simple:
Back up:
- Your BIP39 mnemonic phrase
- Your passphrase, if you use one
That is usually enough for standard wallet recovery.
Do not treat as normal backup items:
- Entropy
- Filtered entropy
- Word indexes
- Extended private keys
- Individual address private keys
- xpubs
- Public addresses
- Wallet files that do not contain your actual recovery material
If someone tells you that you need to back up a long list of technical values from a BIP39 tool, be very suspicious. In most cases, they are trying to get you to reveal something dangerous under the cover of “help.”
If you have already been scammed
If you shared sensitive information and your funds were stolen, act quickly. Move any remaining coins to new addresses generated from a fresh wallet if possible, and avoid reusing compromised keys. Do not trust random “recovery” services that promise guaranteed results for a fee; many are secondary scams.
For more serious cases, or if you want guidance on next steps, see my wallet recovery services page. The goal is to help people understand what happened, reduce further losses where possible, and set up safer practices going forward.
Final takeaway
Crypto wallets contain many different kinds of information, but not all of it carries the same risk. Your recovery phrase and passphrase are your core backup. Extended private keys can expose an account. Individual private keys can drain a specific address. xpubs can reduce privacy and become dangerous if combined with other leaked data. Public addresses are generally safe to share, but they are still visible on a public blockchain.
The simplest rule is this: if you do not fully understand what someone is asking for, do not give it. In crypto, the polite answer to an unsafe request should be “no.” Your money depends on that boundary.
Questions from viewers
Common questions from the comments on this video, with my answers.
Do I need to write down my individual private keys if I already have my seed phrase?
No, you do not need to store them separately. Your private keys are derived directly from your seed phrase, so if you have the seed, you control the keys. If you want to verify that the addresses your hardware wallet is producing match your seed, you can load Ian Coleman's tool in an air-gapped environment like TAILS Linux to view the public and private keys, but this is for verification only, not for backup.
Can I safely spend from just one address on a paper wallet without compromising the others?
Yes, if your funds are split across several addresses, it is straightforward to sweep one specific address into a software wallet (like Coinomi) and send any remaining change back to another receive address in your wallet. This allows you to use partial payments without needing to move the entire content of the paper wallet at once.
Why can't I find a specific Ethereum address using my Ledger seed phrase in the BIP39 tool?
This often happens because older Ledger wallets used a different derivation path than newer ones. You need to select the correct 'derivation path' in the tool. For Ethereum, try selecting the 'BIP32' tab and choosing the 'Coinomi/Ledger' option when Ethereum is selected as your coin; the addresses you are looking for will likely appear there. (Apps and tools change, so check the current version if something looks different.)
Will sending Bitcoin to any address generated by the tool allow me to access it later with Electrum?
Yes. If you input your seed phrase into Electrum and select the exact same derivation path that you used in the BIP39 tool, you will generate the same addresses and be able to access your funds.
Stuck with a wallet recovery?
I maintain BTCRecover and have helped people recover seed phrases, passphrases and wallet passwords since 2019. Book a one-hour video session and I’ll walk you through doing the recovery yourself, without sharing your seed. Or, if you’d rather I run it, a trusted recovery is charged only if it succeeds.
Private sessions: US$100 per hour. Trusted recovery: 10% of recovered funds. I never contact people first and will never ask for your seed phrase over chat or email.
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